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ABSTRACT
We propose a theoretical runtime enforcement framework for
component-based systems (CBS) where we delineate a hierarchy
of enforceable properties (i.e., properties that can be enforced) ac-
cording to the number of observational steps a system is allowed to
deviate from the property (i.e., the notion of k-step enforceability).
To ensure the observational equivalence between the correct execu-
tions of the initial system and the monitored system, we show that
i) only stutter-invariant properties should be enforced on CBS with
our monitors, ii) safety properties are 1-step enforceable. Given an
abstract enforcement monitor for some 1-step enforceable property,
we formally instrument (at relevant locations) a system to integrate
the monitor. At runtime, the monitor observes and automatically
avoids any error in the behavior of the system w.r.t. the property.
1. INTRODUCTION
Users wanting to build complex and heterogeneous systems dis-
pose of a variety of complementary verification techniques to detect
bugs and errors. Techniques are often categorized as static or dy-
namic according to the analyzed information. Interestingly, these
techniques are complementary to each other. Both types of tech-
niques take as input some system representation, perform some
analysis, and yield a verdict indicating the (partial) correctness of
the system in addition to some form of feedback to the user.
We aim to marry software synthesis and dynamic analysis.
While runtime verification complements model-checking, we pro-
pose runtime enforcement (cf. [21, 14, 19]) to complement model
repair. While model repair targets correctness-by-construction,
runtime enforcement, as proposed in this paper, targets correctness-
at-operation. Runtime enforcement is a dynamic technique aim-
ing at ensuring the correct runtime behavior of systems using a
so-called enforcement monitor. At runtime, the monitor consumes
information from the execution (e.g., events) and modifies it when-
ever necessary by, e.g., suppressing forbidden events. Enforcing
properties at runtime has been only studied for monolithic systems
without specifying how systems should be instrumented.
We target component-based systems (CBSs) expressed in the Be-
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havior, Interaction and Priority (BIP) framework [6, 5, 2]. BIP al-
lows to build complex systems by coordinating the behavior of a set
of atomic components. Behavior is described with Labelled Transi-
tion Systems extended with data and C functions. Coordination be-
tween components is done with interactions and priorities between
them. This layered architecture confers a strong expressiveness to
BIP [6]. Moreover, BIP has a rigorous operational semantics: the
behavior of a composite component is formally described as the
composition of the behaviors of its atomic components.
This paper shows how to easily integrate correctness properties
into a CBS (thus allowing separation of concerns). More specifi-
cally, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
- to propose runtime enforcement for CBSs to avoid runtime errors;
- to introduce a new runtime enforcement paradigm: previous en-
forcement approaches introduced monitors that can store “bad
events" in their memory without the possibility of canceling these
events (rolling the system back) to explore alternative executions
(see Sec. 5 for related work): the runtime enforcement paradigm
proposed in this paper prevents the occurrence of misbehaviors;
- to instrument CBSs to observe and minimally alter their behavior;
- to propose formal transformations that takes as input a CBS and a
desired property to produce a supervised system where the prop-
erty is enforced: the resulting system produces only the correct
executions (of the initial system) w.r.t. the considered property.
When synthesizing enforcement monitors for CBSs, the main
challenges are:
- to handle the possible interactions and synchronizations between
components: when intervening on the behavior of a component
by e.g., suppressing the execution of a transition, we need to en-
sure that the synchronized components are also prevented from
performing a connected transition;
- to preserve the observational equivalence between the (correct ex-
ecutionsof the) initial system and the monitored system: for this
purpose, i) we leverage priorities in BIP, and ii) we identify the
set of stutter-invariant properties for which enforcement monitors
can be synthesized and integrated into a system;
- to propose an efficient and complete instrumentation technique:
the monitor receives all events of interest of the property while
not degrading the performance of the system.
Preliminaries and Notation. For two domains of elementsE and
F , we note [E → F ] (resp. [E ⇁ F ]) the set of functions (resp.
partial functions) from E to F . When elements of E depend on
the elements of F , we note {e ∈ E}f∈F ′ , where F ′ ⊆ F , for
{e ∈ E | f ∈ F ′} or {e}f∈F ′ when clear from context. For two
functions v ∈ [X → Y ] and v′ ∈ [X ′ → Y ′], the substitution
function v/v′ ∈ [X ∪ X ′ → Y ∪ Y ′], is defined as: v/v′(x) =
v′(x) if x ∈ X ′ and v(x) otherwise. A Labelled Transition System
(LTS) L is a 3-tuple 〈Lab, Sta,Trans〉 where Lab (resp. Sta) is
the set of labels (resp. states) and Trans ⊆ Sta × Lab × Sta is
the transition relation. The runs of LTS L, noted runs(L), are the
finite sequences over Sta that can be obtained by starting from the
initial state and following the transition relation.
2. BEHAVIOR INTERACTION PRIORITY
2.1 Atomic Components
An atomic component B is endowed with a set of local vari-
ables B.vars ranging over a domain Data. Atomic components
synchronize and exchange data through ports.
DEFINITION 1 (PORT). A port 〈p, xp〉 in B is defined by a
port identifier p, and a set of attached local variables xp, where
xp ⊆ B.vars . We denote 〈p, xp〉 as p, and xp as p.vars .
DEFINITION 2 (ATOMIC COMPONENT). An atomic compo-
nent is a tuple
〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉
, where:
- 〈P,L, T 〉 is an LTS over a set of ports P : L is a set of control
locations and T ⊆ L× P × L is a set of transitions;
- X is a finite set of variables;
- For each transition τ ∈ T : gτ is a Boolean condition overX: the
guard of τ , and fτ ∈ {x := fx(X) | x ∈ X}∗: the computation
of τ , a sequence of assignments to local variables in X .
For a transition τ = 〈l, p, l′〉 ∈ T , l (resp. l′) is referred to
as the source (resp. destination) location and p is a port for in-
teracting with another component. Moreover, τ involves a tran-
sition 〈l, p, gτ , fτ , l′〉 which can be executed only if gτ holds.
l
p→T l′ (resp. l p→T ) is a short for 〈l, p, l′〉 ∈ T (resp. ∃l′ ∈ L :
l
p→T l′). Given a transition τ = 〈l, p, gτ , fτ , l′〉, τ.src, τ.port ,
τ.guard , τ.func, and τ.dest denote l, p, gτ , fτ , and l′, respec-
tively. Also, the set of variables used in a transition is defined as
var(fτ ) = {x ∈ X | x := fx(X) ∈ fτ}. Given an atomic com-
ponent B, B.ports denotes the set of ports of B, B.locs denotes
its set of locations, etc. Figure 1 shows an atomic component.
DEFINITION 3 (SEMANTICS OF ATOMIC COMPONENTS).
The semantics of atomic component 〈P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T ,{fτ}τ∈T 〉 is the LTS 〈P,Q, T0〉, where: (1) Q =
L × [X → Data] × (P ∪ {null}); and (2) T0 =
{〈〈l, v, p〉 , p′(vp′), 〈l′, v′, p′〉〉 ∈ Q × P ×Q | ∃τ = 〈l, p′, l′〉 ∈
T : gτ (v) ∧ v′ = fτ (v/vp′)}, where vp′ ∈ [p′.vars → Data].
A configuration is a triple 〈l, v, p〉 ∈ Q where l ∈ L, v ∈ [X →
Data] is a valuation of variables in X , and p ∈ P is the port
of the last-executed transition (or null otherwise). The evolution
〈l, v, p〉 p
′(vp′ )→ 〈l′, v′, p′〉, where vp′ is a valuation of the variables
in p′.vars , is possible if there exists a transition 〈l, p′, gτ , fτ , l′〉,
s.t. gτ (v) = true. Valuation v is modified to v′ = fτ (v/vp′).
2.2 Composite Components
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Figure 1: Atomic
component
Assuming some atomic components
B1, . . . , Bn, we connect the compo-
nents in {Bi}i∈I with I ⊆ [1, n] us-
ing a connector. A connector γ is used
to specify possible interactions, i.e., the
sets of ports that have to be jointly ex-
ecuted. Two types of ports (synchron,
trigger) are defined in order to specify the feasible interactions
of a connector. A trigger port (represented by a triangle) is ac-
tive: the port can initiate an interaction without synchronizing. A
synchron port (represented by a circle) needs synchronization with
other ports to initiate an interaction.
u u u u
s r1 r2 r3
N u u u
s r1 r2 r3
Rendezvous Broadcast
u u u u
s r1 r2 r3
N u u u
s r1 r2 r3
Rend zvous Broadcast
On the right two connectors are de-
picted: Rendezvous (only the maximal
interaction {s, r1, r2, r3} is possible),
Broadcast (all interactions containing trigger port s are possible).
DEFINITION 4 (CONNECTOR). A connector γ is a tuple
〈Pγ , t, G, F 〉, where:
- Pγ = {pi | pi ∈ Bi.P}i∈I s.t. ∀i ∈ I : Pγ ∩Bi.P = {pi},
- t ∈ [Pγ → {true, false}] s.t. t(p) = true if p is trigger (and
false otherwise),
- G is an expression over variables in ∪i∈I pi.vars (the guard),
- F is an update function defined over variables in ∪i∈I pi.vars .
DEFINITION 5 (INTERACTION). A set of ports
a = {pj}j∈J ⊆ Pγ for some J ⊆ I is an interaction of γ
if either there exists j ∈ J s.t. pj is trigger, or, for all j ∈ J , pj is
synchron and {pj}j∈J = Pγ .
An interaction a has a guard and two functionsGa, Fa, obtained by
projecting G and F on the variables of the ports involved in a. We
denote by I(γ) the set of interactions of γ and I(γ1)∪ . . .∪I(γn)
by I(γ1, . . . , γn). Synchronization through an interaction involves
two steps: evaluating Ga, and applying update function Fa.
DEFINITION 6 (COMPOSITE COMPONENT). A composite
component consists of a set of atomic components {Bi}i∈I and a
set of connectors Γ. The connection of the components in {Bi}i∈I
using set of connectors Γ is denoted by Γ({Bi}i∈I).
The composite component defined from atomic components
{Bi}i∈[1,n] and a set of connectors Γ is noted Γ({B1, . . . , Bn}).
DEFINITION 7 (SEMANTICS OF COMPOSITE COMPONENTS).
A state q of composite component Γ({B1, . . . , Bn}) is an n-tuple
〈q1, . . . , qn〉 where qi = 〈li, vi, pi〉 is a state of Bi. The semantics
of Γ({B1, . . . , Bn}) is an LTS 〈Q,A,−→〉, where:
- Q = B1.Q× . . .×Bn.Q,
- A = ∪γ∈Γ {a ∈ I(γ)} is the set of all possible interactions,
- −→ is the least set of transitions satisfying the following rule:
∃γ ∈ Γ : γ = 〈Pγ , t, G, F 〉 ∃a ∈ I(γ) : a = {pi}i∈I Ga(v(X))
∀i ∈ I : qi pi(vi)−→ i q′i ∧ vi = Fai (v(X)) ∀i 6∈ I : qi = q′i
〈q1, . . . , qn〉 a−→
〈
q′1, . . . , q
′
n
〉
X is the set of variables attached to the ports of a, v is the global
valuation, and Fai is the restriction of F to the variables of pi.
Interaction a can be fired, whenever all its ports are enabled and
its guard (Ga(v(X))) holds. Then, involved components evolve
according to a and not involved components remain in the same
state. Several interactions can be enabled at the same time. Pri-
orities reduce non-determinism: one of the interactions with the
highest priority is chosen in a non-deterministic manner.
DEFINITION 8 (PRIORITY). Adding priority model pi
over Γ({B1, . . . , Bn}) defines a new composite component
pi
(
Γ({B1, . . . , Bn})
)
noted pi(C) and whose behavior is defined
by 〈Q,A,−→pi〉, where −→pi is the least set of transitions
satisfying the following rule:
q
a−→ q′ ¬(∃a′ ∈ A,∃q′′ ∈ Q : a ≺ a′ ∧ q a′−→ q′′)
q
a−→pi q′
Interaction a is enabled whenever a is maximal according to pi. In
BIP, maximal progress is expressed at the level of connectors.
DEFINITION 9 (MAXIMAL PROGRESS). Given a connector
γ and a priority model pi, we have: ∀a, a′ ∈ I(γ): (a ⊂
a′) ∧ (a′ ≺ a /∈ pi) =⇒ a ≺ a′.
Finally, systems are composed of a component and an initial state.
DEFINITION 10 (SYSTEM). A system 〈B, Init〉 consists of a
component B and an initial state Init ∈ B1.L× . . .×Bn.L.
Hierarchical connectors [6]. Given a connector γ we denote by
γ.export the exported port of connector γ, which is used to build
hierarchical connectors. In that case, we use upward and downward
update functions instead of update functions only.
u
N N N
uexport
s r1 r2 r3
 
An example of hierarchical connectors is de-
picted on the right. All interactions contain-
ing s and an interaction of γ are possible, i.e.,
{sr1, sr2, sr3, sr1r2, sr1r3, sr2r3, sr1r2r3}.
3. ABSTRACT RUNTIME ENFORCE-
MENT FOR CBS
We introduce an abstract runtime enforcement framework spe-
cific to CBS that i) considers the specific instrumentation of CBS
to incorporate monitors, and ii) hierarchizes enforceable properties.
Preliminaries. A property Π over Σ is a subset of Σ∗. If a sequence
σ belongs to Π, we note it Π(σ). To evaluate sequences of system
events against properties, we shall use truth-domain B4 containing
truth-values true (>), false (⊥), currently true (>c), and currently
false (⊥c) [3, 16]. Given a sequence σ ∈ Σ and Π ⊆ Σ∗, the
evaluation of σ against Π [16] is defined as:
[[σ]]ΠB4 =

> if Π(σ) ∧ ∀σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : Π(σ · σ′),
>c if Π(σ) ∧ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : ¬Π(σ · σ′),
⊥c if ¬Π(σ) ∧ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : Π(σ · σ′),
⊥ if ¬Π(σ) ∧ ∀σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : ¬Π(σ · σ′).
We consider safety properties over Σ noted Safety(Σ). Note,
for a safety property Π, codom([[·]]ΠB4) ⊆ {⊥,>c,>}.
3.1 Specifying Properties of CBS
Following [18], we consider events as Boolean expressions over
atomic propositions. Atomic propositions express conditions on
components (e.g., a condition on the lastly executed port, current
locations, values of variables). More formally, an event of pi(C) is
defined as a state formula over the atomic propositions over compo-
nents involved in pi(C). Let AP be the set of atomic propositions
defined with the following grammar (where ∗ ∈ {=,≤}):
Atom ::= cpnt1.var1 ∗ cpnt2.var2 | cpnt.var ∗ a_val| cpnt.loc = a_loc | cpnt.port = a_port
cpnt.var ::= x ∈ ∪i∈[1,n]Bi.vars
a_val ::= v ∈ Data
a_loc ::= s ∈ ∪i∈[1,n]Bi.locs
a_port ::= p ∈ ∪i∈[1,n]Bi.ports
We use Prop : Σ → 2AP for the set of atomic propositions
used in an event e ∈ pi(C). For ap ∈ Prop(e), used(ap) is the
sequence of pairs formed by the components and the variables (or
locations or ports) used to define ap. Expression used(ap) is de-
fined using a pattern-matching:
used(ap) = match(ap) with
| cpnt1.var1 ∗ cpnt2.var2 → (cpnt1, var1) · (cpnt2, var2)
| cpnt.var ∗ val→ (cpnt, var)
| cpnt.loc = a_loc→ (cpnt, loc)
| cpnt.port = a_port→ (cpnt, port)
3.2 Enforceable Properties
k-step tolerance and stutter-invariance delineate enforceable
properties. 1
k-step tolerance and enforceability. k-step tolerance models the
maximal number of steps for which the system can deviate from the
property and can still roll back. This might be due to the critical-
ity of the system or the controlability endowed to our enforcement
monitors on the system. Moreover, when a monitor intervenes, it
should not destroy any (future) correct behavior and should deter-
mine that a deviation is definitive. In other words, on any execution
sequence, if the last events made the property unsatisfied, then af-
ter some steps, on receiving an event the monitor should determine
that there is no possible future behavior s.t. the execution again
becomes correct. It is thus legitimate for the monitor to intervene.
DEFINITION 11 (k-STEP ENFORCEABILITY). Π is k-step-
enforceable, if max
{|σ| | ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : [[σ′]]ΠB4 = >c ∧ ∀σp 
σ : [[σ′ · σp]]ΠB4 = ⊥c
}
< k.
The set of k-step enforceable properties is noted Enf (k ,Σ). Π ⊆
Σ∗ is k-step-enforceable, if the length of its maximal factor σ for
which there exists a sequence σ′ (without the factor) that evaluates
to >c and all sequences σ′ · σp obtained by appending a prefix σp
of σ to σ′ evaluate to ⊥c. The constant k additionally represents
the maximal “roll-back distance”, i.e., the number of observational
steps, an enforcement monitor can revert the system.
PROPOSITION 3.1 (ENFORCEABLE PROPERTIES). There ex-
ists a hierarchy of enforceable properties where: (1) ∀k, k′ ∈ N :
k ≤ k′ =⇒ Enf (k ,Σ) ⊆ Enf (k ′,Σ); and (2) for regular
properties, k-step enforceability is decidable.
In the following, we consider monitors that can memorize one state
of the system and thus restore it up to one observational step.2
PROPOSITION 3.2. All safety properties are 1-step-enforceable
as per Definition 11: Safety(Σ) ⊆ Enf (1 ,Σ).
Safety properties are prefix-closed languages. Thus, when a mon-
itor detects a deviation on one event, it is legitimate to intervene
because all deviations from the normal behavior are definitive.
Stutter-invariance. Stutter-invariance [23] stems from the required
instrumentation of CBSs for enforcement monitoring. Monitors
should be able to observe the changes in the system that can im-
pact the satisfaction of atomic propositions. Since monitors should
be able to revert the global state of a system one step in the past,
instrumenting a transition implies to instrument all synchronized
transitions (through a port/interaction). This is a consequence of
BIP semantics. Note, even if an instrumented transition does not
1Contrarily to other runtime enforcement frameworks such as [21, 20], we
do not consider specifications over infinite sequences but finite sequences.
It avoids dealing with enforceability issues due to the semantics of the spec-
ification formalism (over infinite sequences, see [17] for a detailed explana-
tion). In that case, for monolithic systems, all properties are enforceable.
2The complexity of the instrumentation depends on the number of steps
one wants to be able to roll-back the system (see Sec. 4). Considering more
than one steps is left for future work.
interfere with variables observed by the monitor, it is necessary to
instrument it for recovering purposes. Those transitions might be
synchronized with other transitions through some interactions. In
that case, when executing one of these (instrumented) interactions,
the monitor receives the same “event” while the system has not
changed. The evaluation of the property should not change.
DEFINITION 12 (STUTTER-INVARIANCE [23]). Two se-
quences of events σ, σ′ ∈ Σ∗ are stutter-equivalent if there
exist a0, . . . , ak ∈ Σ for some k s.t. σ and σ′ belong to the
set defined by regular expression a+0 · a+1 · · · a+k . A property
Π ⊆ Σ∗ is stutter-invariant, if for any stutter-equivalent sequences
σ, σ′ ∈ Σ∗, we have (σ ∈ Π and σ′ ∈ Π) or (σ /∈ Π and σ′ /∈ Π).
Based on Proposition 3.2, we finally consider the set of stutter-
invariant safety properties as the enforceable properties on CBS.
3.3 Abstract Runtime Enforcement for CBS
Runtime oracle. A runtime oracle is a deterministic finite-state ma-
chine that consumes events and produces verdicts.
DEFINITION 13 (RUNTIME ORACLE [17]). An oracleO is a
tuple
〈
ΘO, θOinit,Σ,−→O,B4, verdictO
〉
. The finite set ΘO de-
notes the control states and θOinit ∈ ΘO is the initial state. The
complete function−→O: ΘO×Σ→ ΘO is the transition function.
In the following we abbreviate −→O (θ, a) = θ′ by θ a−→O θ′.
Function verdictO : ΘO → B4 is an output function, producing
verdicts (i.e., truth-values) in B4 from control states.
Runtime oracles are independent from any formalism used to gen-
erate them and are able to check any linear-time property [16].3
Intuitively, evaluating a property with an oracle works as follows.
An execution sequence is processed in a lockstep manner. On each
received event, the oracle produces an appraisal on the sequence
read so far. For the formal semantics of the oracle and a formal
definition of sequence checking, we refer to [16]. Figure 2 shows
an example of a runtime oracle that observes e∗1 ·e∗2, where e1 (resp.
e2) denotes that variable x in component comp1 is strictly positive
(resp. strictly negative).
>c >c
⊥
comp1 .x < 0
comp1 .x < 0comp1 .x > 0
comp1 .x = 0 comp1 .x ≥ 0
Figure 2: Runtime oracle
Enforcement Monitor. An enforce-
ment monitor (EM) is a finite-
state machine that transforms a se-
quence of events from the program
to one that evaluates on “good ver-
dicts” of the oracle. The remaining
description of the EM and how it
interacts with the system serves as an abstract description of our
instrumentation of CBSs in Sec. 4. Compared to enforcement mon-
itors proposed in the literature, the ones introduced in this paper
feature the ability to emit cancellation events to revert the system
back to a state where the underlying property is satisfied.
DEFINITION 14 (ENFORCEMENT MONITOR). The EM asso-
ciated to runtime oracle O = 〈ΘO, θOinit,Σ,−→O,B4, verdictO〉
is a tuple E = 〈ΘE , θOinit,Σ ∪ Σ,−→E〉 where:
- ΘE ⊆ ΘO ∪ΘO with ΘO = {θe | e ∈ Σ ∧ θ ∈ ΘO} s.t. ΘE is
reachable from θOinit with −→E ,
- Σ = {e | e ∈ Σ} is the set of cancellation events,
- −→E is the transition function defined as −→E={〈θ, e, θ′〉 ∈−→O| verdictO(θ′) ∈ {>,>c}} ∪
{〈θ, e, θe〉 , 〈θe, e, θ〉 | ∃θ′ ∈ Θ : 〈θ, e, θ′〉 ∈−→O
∧ verdictO(θ′) = ⊥}.
3The runtime oracle to be synthesized from a specification, using some
monitor synthesis algorithm. We assume the oracle to be consistent: in any
state, it should evaluate logically-equivalent events in the same way.
An EM follows the structure of a runtime oracle. For each transi-
tion 〈θ, e, θ′〉 leading to a “bad” location θ′ (verdictO(θ′) = ⊥),
we add a transition 〈θ, e, θe〉 leading to a fresh intermediate state
θe and a transition 〈θe, e, θ〉 back to state θ labelled by the corre-
sponding cancellation event.
Composition of a system with a monitor. We define the composi-
tion of a system with an enforcement monitor. The composition
assumes some instrumentation function inst : Sta → Σ that gen-
erates the event in Σ that holds according to the information con-
tained in a state and the event fired by the LTS.
DEFINITION 15 (COMPOSING A SYSTEM WITH A MONITOR).
Given a system LTS L = 〈Lab,Sta,Trans〉, and an en-
forcement monitor E =
〈
ΘO ∪ΘO, θOinit,Σ ∪ Σ,−→E
〉
for a safety property where states in ΘO are associ-
ated to currently good and good verdicts, the composi-
tion is the LTS
〈
Lab,Sta× (ΘO ∪ΘO),Mon
〉
, noted
L ⊗inst EM , where the transition relation Mon ⊆
Sta × (ΘO ∪ ΘO) × Lab × Sta × (ΘO ∪ ΘO) is defined
by the two following semantics rules (where e = inst(q, la)):
q
la−→Trans q′ e /∈ Σ
〈q, θ〉 la−→Mon
〈
q′, θ
〉 (1)
q
la−→Trans q′ θ e−→E θ′ θ′ ∈ ΘO
〈q, θ〉 la−→Mon
〈
q′, θ′
〉 (2)
q
la−→Trans q′ θ e−→E θe θe ∈ ΘO θe e−→O θ
〈q, θ〉 −→Mon 〈q, θ〉
(3)
At runtime, an enforcement monitor executes in a lockstep manner
with the system. When the system emits an event that is of interest
for the enforcement monitor (i.e., an event inst(q, la) /∈ Σ), the
enforcement monitors lets the system execute without intervening
(first semantics rule). When the system emits an event that leads
to a currently-good or good location, the enforcement monitor sim-
ply follows the system (second semantics rule). When the system
emits an event that leads to a bad location according to the oracle,
the enforcement monitor executes a cancellation event. In the third
semantics rule, state q′ is called an unstable state: it is a state where
the system never actually stays in because the enforcement moni-
tor inserts immediately a cancellation event. During an execution
when the enforcement monitor executes event e, it says that the ef-
fect of the execution step that leads to event e should be “reverted"
on the system: the system and monitor return to their previous state.
Consider a safety property over Σ and a system emitting events
over Lab composed with the enforcement monitor (obtained from
the property), using an instrumentation function inst : Sta → Σ.
Any execution of the composition seen through the instrumentation
function inst does not deviate from the property. Note that the
initial LTS deviates by at most 1 event before being corrected.
PROPOSITION 3.3. Given Π ∈ Safety(Σ), its enforcement
monitor EM , and a system LTS L, we have:
∀σ ∈ runs(L⊗inst EM) : inst(σ) ∈ Π ∧ σ ∈ runs(L) .
The proposition states that the composed system produces only cor-
rect executions that belong to the initial LTS.
4. RUNTIME ENFORCEMENT FOR BIP
We integrate a runtime oracle O =〈
ΘO, θOinit,Σ,−→O,B4, verdictO
〉
for some (enforceable)
property into a BIP system
(
pi(Γ({B1, . . . , Bn})),
〈
l10, . . . , l
n
0
〉 )
.
Some transformations are defined w.r.t. an atomic component
B =
〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉
.
4.1 Analysis and Extraction of Information
For a property expressed over Σ(pi(Γ({B1, . . . , Bn}))):
- mon_vars(Bi) is the set of variables used in the prop-
erty related to component Bi, formally mon_vars(Bi)
def
=
{Bi.x | ∃e ∈ Σ, ∃ap ∈ Prop(e) : (Bi, x) ∈ used(ap)},
- occur is the set of all monitored variables, formally occur def=⋃
i∈[1,n] mon_vars(Bi).
For instance for the property described by the runtime oracle in
Figure 2, we have mon_vars(comp1 ) = {comp1 .x}.
4.2 Instrumenting Transitions
We should only instrument the transitions that may mod-
ify some monitored variables. We denote by select_trans(B)
the set of the transitions that should be instrumented in B.
A transition is instrumented if either (1) it modifies some
monitored variables, or (2) some monitored variables are as-
signed to its port. If the property refers to the location or
to a port of a component B (e.g., if B.loc = l0 appears
in the property), then all transitions of B should be instru-
mented. For the component in Figure 1, select_trans(comp1 ) =
{(l, p, x > 0, [y := x+ t], l′)} since variable x is attached to port
p and comp1 .x ∈ mon_vars(comp1 ).
Instrumenting a transition consists in splitting it into four transi-
tions. First, we reconstruct the initial transition. Second, we create
a transition to interact with the monitor through port pm. Finally,
we create two transitions: one to recover (through port pr) when
the property is violated and another to continue (through port pc)
otherwise. In case of recovery, the modified variables are restored.
Ports pm, pr, pc are special, their purpose is detailed in Sec. 4.3.
DEFINITION 16 (INSTRUMENTING A TRANSITION). For
any transition τ = 〈l, g, p, f, l′〉 in T , inst_trans(τ) ={
τ i, τm, τ c, τr
}
, where:
- τ i =
〈
l, g, p, f i, lm
〉
, where f i is equal to f followed by:
- [loc := “l′”] if Bi.loc ∈ mon_vars(Bi) ∧ Bi.port /∈
mon_vars(Bi);
- [port := “p”] if Bi.loc /∈ mon_vars(Bi) ∧ Bi.port ∈
mon_vars(Bi);
- [loc := “l′”; port := “p”] if Bi.loc ∈ mon_vars(Bi) ∧
Bi.port ∈ mon_vars(Bi),
- τm = 〈lm, true, pm, [ ], lr〉, τ c = 〈lr, true, pc, [ ], l′〉, τr =
〈lr, true, pr, fr, l〉, where fr = [x1 := xtmp1 ; . . . ;xj := xtmpj ]
with {x1, . . . , xj} = {x | x ∈ p.vars ∨ x := fx(X) ∈ f}.
EXAMPLE 1 (INSTRUMENTING A TRANSITION). Figure 3
shows how the red transition in Figure 1 is instrumented. On
recovery, we restore all the variables that are modified when
executing that transition. Recall that some of the variables could
be modified indirectly through the port of the transition (p), e.g., x
and z.
Recall that an interaction synchronizes a set of transitions and its
execution implies firing all its corresponding transitions. Hence, re-
covering implies to restore the previous global state of the system.
For this purpose, instrumenting a transition τ ∈ select_trans(Bi)
implies the instrumentation of all transitions synchronizing with τ
through an interaction. We define rec_trans to be the set of all tran-
sitions that should be instrumented. We also define rec_comp to be
the set of components that contain at least one instrumented tran-
sition, and rec_inter to be the set of connectors synchronizing on
at least one instrumented transition. Formally: (1) rec_trans-i def=
∪i∈[1,n] select_trans(Bi); (2) rec_trans def= rec_trans-i∪{τ |
∃γ ∈ Γ, ∃τk ∈ rec_trans-i : {τ.port , τk.port} ⊆ Pγ}; (3)
rec_comp def= {Bi | Bi.T ∩ rec_trans 6= ∅}; (4) rec_inter def=
{a ∈ Γ | ∃τ ∈ rec_trans : τ.port ∈ Pγ}.
4.3 Instrumenting Atomic Components
Let T rB = rec_trans∩B.trans be the set of transitions that
should be instrumented in B (noted T r when clear from context).
We create new temporary/recovery variables used to store the val-
ues of the variables that could be modified on an instrumented
transition. More precisely, for each variable that can be modi-
fied through a function or attached to a port of an instrumented
transition, we create a corresponding temporary variable for it.
Given a set of transitions, we define the set of variables that should
be recovered as follows: rec_vars(T ′) def=
⋃
τ∈T ′ τ.port .vars ∪
var(τ.func). If the enforcement monitor needs to observe the lo-
cation or the port being executed, we create two new variables4
port and loc that store the name of the next location and the name
of the port being executed. We create three new ports: (1) pm is
used to send the values of monitored variables to the monitor; (2)
pc is used to receive a continue notification from the monitor; (3)
pr is used to receive a recovery notification from the monitor. Fi-
nally, we split each of its instrumented transitions in T r according
to Definition 16, and we create new locations accordingly.
DEFINITION 17 (INSTRUMENTING AN ATOMIC COMPONENT).
Instrumentation function inst transforms an input atomic com-
ponent: inst(B) is: (1) B if B /∈ rec_comp; (2) 〈P inst, Linst,
T inst, X inst, {gτ}τ∈T inst , {fτ}τ∈T inst〉, otherwise. where:
- X inst = X ∪ {v | Bi .v ∈ mon_vars(Bi)} ∪
{xtmp | x ∈ rec_vars(T r)} where, if Bi.loc ∈ mon_vars(Bi)
(resp. Bi.port ∈ mon_vars(Bi)), loc (resp. port) is initialized
to li0 (resp. null), recovery/temporary variables are initialized
to the values of their corresponding variables,
- P inst = P ∪ {〈pm,mon_vars(Bi)〉 , 〈pc, ∅〉 , 〈pr, ∅〉},
- Linst = L ∪ {lmτ | τ ∈ T r} ∪ {lrτ | τ ∈ T r},
- T inst = (T \ T r) ∪ (⋃τ∈Tr inst_trans(τ)).
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Figure 3: Instrumenting an atomic component
EXAMPLE 2 (INSTRUMENTING AN ATOMIC COMPONENT).
Figure 3 shows the instrumentation of the atomic component in
Figure 1. Note that only the transition in red is instrumented.
Also, the variables attached to port pm (i.e., only comp1 .x in this
example) are those extracted from the oracle (see Figure 2), i.e.,
monitored variables of that component. Moreover, the function of
the recovery transition (i.e., labelled with with pr) recovers the
variables that could be modified, i.e., x, y, and z since variables x
and z are attached to port p and y is assigned on the transition.
Next, we consider an instrumented atomic component Binst =
inst(B). After instrumenting an atomic component, we must also
4Variables created by the transformations have fresh name w.r.t. existing
variables of the input system.
create a backup (in temporary variables) of the variables that could
be modified after executing an instrumented transition. For each
transition, we select all transitions of the destination that are instru-
mented, and backup the variables that could be modified on them.
DEFINITION 18 (BACKUP INJECTION). We define the
backup injection function inj that transforms an input (already
instrumented) atomic component s.t. inj(Binst) = Brec =〈
P inst, Linst, T rec, X inst, {gτ}τ∈T rec , {fτ}τ∈T rec
〉
, where:
T rec =
{〈
l, g, p, f ; [xtmp1 := x1; . . . ;x
tmp
j := xj ], l
′
〉
| τ = 〈l, g, p, f, l′〉 ∈ T inst ∧ {x1, . . . , xj} =
rec_vars(
{
τ i ∈ Binst.T r | τ i.src = l′ ∧ τ i.port ∈ P})}.
Next, we consider Brec = inj(Binst) with injected backup.
EXAMPLE 3 (BACKUP INJECTION). Figure 4 shows backup
injection (in blue). Variables x and z are backed up on transitions
entering l0 because they are modified on two outgoing transitions.
4.4 Creating an Enforcement Monitor in BIP
from an Oracle
l0
p
q
pm pc
pm pc
pr[z := ztmp]
pr[x := xtmp]
[ztmp := z;xtmp := x]
[ztmp := z;xtmp := x]
Figure 4: Injecting backup into an atomic com-
ponent.
We trans-
form an
oracle O
into a BIP
enforcement
monitor E
that mimics
the behavior
of the enforcement monitor associated to O. E contains a copy
of monitored variables and a backup of them. When the system
executes an interaction that synchronizes at least one instrumented
transition, it interacts with E through port pm and sends the new
values of monitored variables. E notifies the system to continue or
to recover, accordingly. In case of recovery (resp. continue), the
monitored variables should be recovered (resp. backup) .
DEFINITION 19 (BUILDING AN ENFORCEMENT MONITOR).
From oracle O we define enforcement monitor E =〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉
as an atomic component:
- X = occur∪Xtmp with Xtmp = {xtmp | x ∈ occur},
- P = {〈pm, occur〉 , 〈pc, ∅〉 , 〈pr, ∅〉},
- L = L> ∪ Lm with L> = {q | q ∈ ΘO ∧ verdictO(q) ∈
{>,>c}} and Lm =
{
qm | q ∈ L>},
- T = Tm ∪ T r ∪ T c with
- Tm =
{〈q, pm, true, [ ], qm〉 | q ∈ L>};
- T c =
{
〈qm, pc, e, fc, q′〉 | q e−→O q′ ∧ verdictO(q′) = >
}
,
where fc = [xtmp1 := x1; . . . ;x
tmp
j = xj ] with〈
xtmp1 , . . . , x
tmp
j
〉
= Xtmp;
comp1.x = 0
pm pc prcomp1.xcomp1.x
tmp
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tmp := comp1.x] [comp1.x
tmp := comp1.x]
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comp1.x < 0
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tmp]
Figure 5: Enforcement monitor
- T r =
{
〈qm, pr, e, fr, q〉 | q e−→O q′ ∧ verdictO(q′) = ⊥
}
,
where fr = [x1 := xtmp1 ; . . . ;xj := x
tmp
j ] with〈
xtmp1 , . . . , x
tmp
j
〉
= Xtmp.
EXAMPLE 4 (BUILDING AN ENFORCEMENT MONITOR).
Figure 5 depicts the enforcement monitor in BIP generated
from the runtime oracle in Figure 2. From the initial state, the
enforcement monitor synchronizes with the system by receiving the
value of comp1 .x through port pm. Then, it either recovers (when
comp1 .x = 0), or continues otherwise. In case of continue (resp.
recovery), variable comp1 .x is backed up (resp. recovered).
4.5 Integration
We define the connection between the instrumented atomic com-
ponents pi(Γ({Brec1 , . . . , Brecn })) and enforcement monitor E . We
connect the pm ports of the instrumented components with port
pm of E (γm). All the ports of that connector should be trigger
to make all interactions possible. Because of maximal progress,
all the enabled pm ports of the instrumented components will be
synchronized with port pm of E . The update function of that con-
nector transfers the updated values of the monitored variables from
the instrumented atomic components to E .
Then, we connect all continue ports (pc) of instrumented com-
ponents, with a connector with trigger ports and connected hierar-
chically to port pc of E . The ports of the hierarchical connector
are synchron so that the synchronization between ports pc of in-
strumented components requires port pc of E to be enabled. This
is necessary because the instrumented components will be ready to
execute both the continue and the recoverable ports based on the
decision taken by E . Similarly, we connect the recoverable ports.
Finally, the priority model is augmented by giving more priority
to the interactions defined by the monitored, continue, and recovery
connections. Modifying the priority model ensures that, after the
execution of an interaction synchronizing some instrumented tran-
sition, E notifies first the system to recover or continue before in-
volving other interactions synchronizing instrumented transitions.
Note that, when some of the ports pm of the instrumented atomic
components are enabled, the port pm of E is also enabled. However,
the instrumented atomic components could be in a state where none
of their pm ports are enabled. To prevent E from moving without
synchronizing with the components, the port pm of E is synchron.
DEFINITION 20 (INTEGRATION - SPIN RECOVERY).
The composite component is pirec(Γrec(Brec1 , . . . , B
rec
n , E)),
where:
- Γrec = Γ ∪ {γm, γc1 , γc2 , γr1 , γr2}, where:
- γm = 〈Pγm , tγm , true, Fγm〉, where:
- Pγm = {〈Bi.pm,mon_vars(Bi)〉}Bi∈rec_comp ∪ {E .p
m},
tγm(E .pm) = false and ∀p ∈ Pγm \ {E .pm} : tγm(p) =
true,
- Fγm , the update function, is the identity data transfer from
the variables in the ports of the interacting components to the
corresponding variables in the oracle port.
- γc1 = 〈Pγc1 , tγc1 , true, [ ]〉, γc2 = 〈Pγc2 , tγc2 , true, [ ]〉,
where:
- Pγc1 = {〈Bi.pc, ∅〉}Bi∈rec_comp and ∀p ∈ Pγc1 : tγc1 (p) =
true,
- Pγc2 = {γc1 .export , E .pc} and tγc2 (γc1 .export) =
tγc2 (E .pc) = false.
- γr1 = 〈Pγr1 , tγr1 , true, [ ]〉 , γr2 = 〈Pγr2 , tγr2 , true, [ ]〉,
where:
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Figure 6: Supervised system.
- Pγr1 = {〈Bi.pr, ∅〉}Bi∈rec_comp and ∀p ∈ Pγr1 :
tγr1 (Bi.p
r) = true,
- Pγr2 = {γr1 .export , E .pr} and tγr2 (γr1 .export) =
tγr2 (E .pr) = false,
- pirec = pi ∪ {〈a, a′〉 | a ∈ ∪γ∈rec_interI(γ) ∧ a′ ∈
I(γm, γc1 , γc2 , γr1 , γr2)}.
Note that, the instrumented system defined above may be inefficient
in some cases. For instance, when E notifies the system to recover,
the system may execute again one of the previously executed bad
interactions.
EXAMPLE 5 (INTEGRATION). Figure 6 shows the supervised
system with E . We assume that the monitored variables are mod-
ified only when executing interactions a0 and a1. Consequently,
component B3 remains unchanged.
4.6 On the Correctness and Behavior of the
Supervised System
Correctness of our approach relies on our instrumentation tech-
nique and stems from the facts that we consider safety properties
and that, as it was similarly expressed at the abstract level, our en-
forcement monitors roll-back the system by one step as soon as the
system emits an event that violates the property.
More formally, the correctness of our transformations can be ex-
pressed by mapping the concepts in this section to the concepts
of our abstract runtime enforcement framework (Proposition 3.3).
Consider S the supervised system resulting from the previous trans-
formations and the safety property over the alphabet used to syn-
thesize the runtime oracle used as input to our transformations. In-
strumenting atomic components of a BIP system and integrating it
with the enforcement monitor results in an LTS that is as obtained
with the composition operator defined in Definition 15.
PROPOSITION 4.1. Consider the mapping described above,
Proposition 3.3 holds for Π, the abstracted LTS and the abstract
enforcement monitor. Moreover, the supervised BIP system weakly
simulates the restriction of the initial BIP system to its traces satis-
fying Π.
5. RELATEDWORK
Model repair. Recent efforts (e.g., [11]) aim at adapting model-
checking abstraction techniques to model repair. Our approach
fundamentally differs from model repair. First our approach op-
erates at runtime: we do not statically modify systems as our prop-
erties are expressive enough so that model-checking is undecidable
or does not scale. Moreover, our objective is to minimally alter the
initial behavior of the system. Correct executions are preserved and
yield observationaly equivalent executions.
Theories of fault-tolerance [1]. Close to our approach is a frame-
work for fault recovery in CBSs [7] which assumes a fault-model
as input (i.e., a labelling of all system transitions as normal, faulty,
and recovery), and then characterizes the conditions for a system
to converge to a normal behavior. The considered systems are non-
masking, i.e., i) faults are recovered within a finite number of re-
covery actions, and ii) and the system always progresses. Both
the later and our approach target BIP systems. However, [7] takes
as input fault-tolerant programs and assumes fault-tolerance being
encoded inside the target program. In [1], the system is seen as a
collection of guarded commands. In [7], fault detection and recov-
ery span across multiple components. Both approaches fall short
in meeting the modularity requirement of CBSs. Indeed, programs
in [1] do not have their own state-space. The fault models consid-
ered in [7] assumes fault detection and recovery to concern several
components with inter-dependent interactions.
Supervisory approaches to fault-tolerance. Some techniques are
based on supervisory-control theory and controller synthesis [10].
Similar objectives are to synthesize a mechanism that is maximally
permissive and ensures fault-tolerance by disabling the controllable
transitions that would either make the system diverge from the ex-
pected behavior or prevent it from reaching the expected behav-
ior. In supervisory approaches the fault is due to a system action
(cf. [22]). Faults are uncontrollable events and after their occur-
rence, the controller recovers the system within a finite number of
steps. Moreover, the non-faulty part of the system needs to be avail-
able and distinguishable from the system. Such approaches fall in
the scope of our framework where monitors can enforce the non-
occurrence of a particular action. Moreover, as BIP systems usually
contain data, guards and assignments, it is generally not possible to
statically compute the faulty behavior in the system.
Runtime enforcement for monolithic systems [21, 20, 19]. Several
sets of enforceable properties were proposed with their associated
enforcement monitors. Restrictions to the set of enforceable spec-
ifications stem from the fact that the considered specifications are
over infinite executions sequences. As shown in [17], when con-
sidering specifications over finite sequences, all properties become
enforceable. In this paper, we consider specifications over finite se-
quences but point out restrictions arising from the features of CBSs.
Moreover, the runtime enforcement paradigm proposed in this pa-
per improves previous ones. Indeed, upon the detection of bad be-
haviors, previous paradigms proposed to “accumulate events” in a
memory until a future event makes the property satisfied (in case of
progress properties) or to halt the execution (in case of safety prop-
erties). The enforcement paradigm proposed in this paper, studied
now for safety properties but stated generally for any property, pre-
vents and avoids the occurrence of faults by reverting the effect of
events that lead to a deviation from the desired behaviors, restoring
the system in a state before the fault occurrence.
Dynamic techniques for CBSs. [12] proposes FTPL, a customiza-
tion of Linear Temporal Logic to specify the correctness of com-
ponent reconfigurations in Fractal. Then, [13] proposes to runtime
verify the correctness of architectures. Independently, [18] pro-
poses runtime verification for BIP systems with monitors for the
conformance of the runtime behavior against linear-time properties.
All these approaches allowed only the detection of errors and not
their correction using recovery. As [18] is only concerned with (the
simpler problem) of runtime verification, it considers all properties
as monitorable. In this paper, we introduce a notion of enforceable
properties specific to CBS and parametrized by a notion of number
of tolerance steps. While the purpose of the transformations in [18]
is to introduce a monitor and transmit snapshots of the system to
it, the transformations proposed in this paper additionally grant the
monitor with primitives to backup the system state and control it.
As seen in Sec. 4, to preserve the system consistency on a roll-back,
not only the parts of the system involved with the property are in-
strumented but also the “connected” parts. Finally, our approach
provides stronger correctness guarantees.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
6.1 Conclusion
This paper introduces runtime enforcement for component-based
systems described in the BIP framework. Our approach considers
an input system whose behavior may deviate from a desired spec-
ification. We identify the set of stutter-invariant safety properties
as enforceable on component-based systems. Restrictions on the
set of enforceable specifications come from i) the number of steps
the system is allowed to deviate from the specification (before be-
ing corrected) and ii) the constraints imposed by instrumentation.
We propose a series of formal transformations of a (non-monitored)
system to integrate an enforcement monitor, using the oracle of the
specification as input. As a result, runtime enforcement provides
an interesting complementary validation method as the validity of
the specification is generally either undecidable or leads to an in-
tractable state-explosion problem.
6.2 Perspectives
An assumption of this paper is that events are formed with state-
based information (using e.g., the current location, values of vari-
ables). If the desired property refers to events involving event-
based information (e.g., execution of a function, exchange of mes-
sages), adequate cancellation of events have to be also provided.
Another interesting problem is to consider more expressive prop-
erties (i.e., non-safety) such as k-step enforceable properties (with
k > 1) to allow transactional behavior. It will entail to find an
alternative instrumentation technique and avoid hard-coding the
connections between the initial system and the monitor. We will
consider more dynamic connections between components using the
(recent) dynamic version of BIP [9], combined with a memoriza-
tion mechanism to store the state-history of components.
Moreover, we will work towards the decentralization of the en-
forcement monitor to allow them to take decisions alone. The ex-
pected benefit is to reduce communication in the system. For this
purpose, we shall inspire from [4, 15] which considers the problem
of decentralizing verification monitors in monolithic systems, and
also from [8] which distributes a centralized scheduler of compo-
nents for a given distributed architecture.
Finally, we shall consider optimization techniques to further re-
duce the performance impact on the initial system. For this pur-
pose, we consider using various static analysis on both the specifi-
cation and the system to reduce the needed instrumentation.
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